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The Continuing Liability of Original Lessees After Assignment of Lease –  
Time for Reconsideration? 
 
W D Duncan* 
This article examines the maintenance of privity of contract between the original 
parties to a non-retail commercial lease after assignment against the background 
of changes to that rule made in England and Wales in 1996 and being made 
progressively in Australia in the case of retail shop leases. It calls for a re-
consideration of the rule along the lines of the Landlord and Tenant 
(Covenants) Act 1995 (UK) which presages a relaxation of the current 
restrictions upon refusal of consent to assignments of lease but without any 
residual liability in the immediate assignor of the lease remaining. The article 
concludes by presaging that the time may have arrived for re-considering the 
whole concept of retaining differences between privity of contract and privity of 
estate. 
 
Context 
Until the enactment of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 in England and Wales1 it 
was a rule of long standing there that the original lessee remained liable to the original lessor to 
perform the obligations under the lease for the entire term, notwithstanding that the lessee may 
have disposed of their leasehold interest.2 Thus, if a later assignee of the lease failed to pay 
rent or perform any other covenant, and that subsequent assignee could not satisfy the lessor, 
the lessor could turn for redress to the original lessee who remained liable by virtue of the 
doctrine of privity of contract.3  Except in the case of some retail shop leases,4 this rule remains 
applicable to all other commercial leases in Australia.  In Re Teller Home Furnishers Pty Ltd (in 
liquidation), Electronic Industries v Horsburg,5 Gowans J explained the position succinctly as 
follows: 
 
“Upon the assignment of the lease by the lessee to the assignee company with the 
consent of the owners, without more, the liability for the payment of rent would be 
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continued to be imposed on a premises, and the implied liability to pay it would pass to 
the assignee company by reason of privity of a estate existing between the owners and 
the assignee company.  The implied liability in the original lessee would cease but the 
express liability under the covenants would continue.”6 
 
This liability in the original lessee remains for the duration of the lease notwithstanding it may 
have passed through the hands of several successive assignees and, subject to any express 
indication to the contrary in the lease itself, even when the assignee has extended the term of 
the lease through the exercise of an option to renew.7   
 
There are a number of consequences arising from the continuing liability of the original lessee 
and, indeed, any guarantor of the original lessee, respectively which may be inappropriate in 
modern times, particularly given the reform of the law in England and Wales and of the express 
exclusion of this type of liability remaining in assignors in various State and Territory retail shop 
lease legislation.  This article explores the extent of the existing rule in relation to commercial 
leases of non retail premises and urges a reconsideration of the rule.  Before considering the 
various arguments for the maintenance of the status quo or for a change, it is appropriate to 
consider how the relationship of the lessor, assignor and assignee changes upon registration of 
a transfer of a registered lease. 
 
Mechanics of Lease Assignment 
Save for South Australia, in relation to registered land, there is statutory provision to the general 
effect that upon registration of a transfer of a lease, the estate or interest of the transferor with 
all “rights, powers and privileges”8 shall pass to the transferee, and the transferee shall become 
subject to liabilities which the transferee would have been liable if named in the instrument 
originally as lessee of that estate or interest.9 Similar language to that expressed in these 
sections relating to assignment of leases, was narrowly interpreted in Measures v McFadyen,10 
where it was held that the right to sue for damages for a breach of covenant complete before 
the transfer occurred, was not transferred by virtue of this provision to the assignee. The right of 
action was described by Griffith CJ in that decision11 as a “mere chose in action” or a merely 
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personal right which did not attach to the estate or interest being transferred. The same 
provisions are used in respect of transfers of registered mortgages and, in that respect, the 
courts have also limited the subject matter of what might be transferred to exclude personal 
rights not affecting the land. Thus, in Consolidated Trust Co v Naylor,12 the High Court held that 
the equivalent sections did not operate to vest in the transferee of a mortgage the right to sue a 
guarantor on a covenant of guarantee included in the mortgage because, broadly speaking, the 
guarantee was collateral and did not affect the land.13 Thus, for instance, whilst the assignment 
of a lease and the registration of that assignment would pass the benefit of the option to renew, 
as a covenant which touched and concerned the land, to the assignee. It would not pass the 
benefit of an option to purchase in the lease which is a covenant not touching and concerning 
the land. Thus, an option to purchase would have to be separately assigned outside the 
statutory assignment framework.14 More recently, the principle in relation to the transfer of 
leases and the inability of a transfer to assign personal rights was confirmed in Jodaway Pty Ltd 
v Langton,15 where the court found that the right of the assignees of a deceased lessee, his 
personal representatives, to recover a sum of money payable by a retirement village described 
under the lease as a “refundable ingoing contribution” did not pass to those personal 
representatives upon registration of a transfer of the lease in their name. That right remained 
personal and the registration of the transfer of the lease under s 62 of the Land Title Act 1994 
(Qld) did not pass the right to enforce the repayment of that money by the lessor to those 
personal representatives.16 
 
The inability of the statutory framework to properly pass the benefit and burden of all covenants 
in a lease upon an assignment of the lease in all jurisdictions has led to the practice by lessors, 
upon their consent being given to the assignment of a lease, in insisting that assignees of 
leases enter into a deed of covenant with them to take effect upon the assignment in order to 
create privity of contract between the lessor and the assignee. As often as not, the outgoing 
lessee, the assignor in the transaction may also be a party to this deed.  The lessor would have 
the opportunity in that deed, for consideration, to release the existing lessee, whether the 
original lessee or a subsequent assignor, from the privity of contract that had been previously 
created either by the lease or by a previously executed deed of covenant. However, in practice, 
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lessors are loathed to release any party, including guarantors outside the lease, from their 
contractual obligations to make good the rent and observe the covenants until the expiry of the 
term. Indeed, in J Lyons and Company Ltd v Knowles,17 the court confirmed that where upon 
each successive assignment of leased premises, the lessors obtained from each incoming 
assignee, a covenant that the assignee would during the residue of the term granted by the 
lease pay the rent and observe the lessees covenant, each successive assignee remained 
liable under those covenants to the effect that upon default by any one of those subsequent 
assignees, any earlier assignee would become liable for the arrears of rent or loss or damage 
suffered by the lessor.18 There is nothing in the law to compel a lessor to release the original 
lessee or, indeed, any subsequent assignees of the lease as a condition of granting consent to 
the assignment where privity of contract remains between the lessor and those other parties. 
 
Most commercial leases contain a right of the lessee to assign, qualified by the condition that 
consent to such assignment will not be unreasonably withheld by the lessor. In New South 
Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory, where a lease contains this right, such a 
provision will apply not withstanding anything to the contrary in the lease.19 In earlier times, the 
refusal of consent to an assignment could only be based upon relatively narrow grounds to do 
with the personality of the proposed assignee or the subject matter of the lease.20 However, 
more recently, courts have been prepared to look beyond those narrow reasons and to hold the 
refusal of consent to an assignment of a lease to be reasonable if, by permitting the assignment, 
other property interests of the lessor beyond the leased area might be adversely affected if the 
assignment proceeded. Put simply, the lessor might still be acting reasonably in refusing 
consent to an assignment if the lessor reasonably considered that the proposed transaction 
might damage the lessor’s property interests generally.21 Thus, although the refusal by a lessor 
to consent to an assignment of the lease may be successfully challenged in a court by an 
outgoing assignor, a lessor certainly has more discretion to consent or refuse an assignment 
than a lessor might have had in earlier times in relation to the selection of a lessee. It is 
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submitted that this factor is relevant to the balancing of rights between a lessor and lessee if 
consideration were given to abolishing the privity rule. 
 
Limitation Upon Rule: Subsequent Variation of Lease Resulting in Increase in Liability of 
Original Lessee 
An original lessee has no control over the subsequent variations of a lease agreed to between 
the lessor and lessee during the term of the lease. It is accepted that the original lessee agrees 
to the terms and conditions of a lease as they stand including for example a rent review clause 
or a clause permitting assignment with consent. Whilst the original lessee may have at the 
outset had no intention of assigning the lease, that lessee must concede that if it is desired to 
take advantage of the right of assignment, then the consequences could follow over which the 
original lessee has no control. One of these consequences may be a significant increase in the 
rent following a review contemplated by the lease which would increase the potential liability of 
the original lessee in the event of default by a subsequent assignee.22 However, there is a point 
at which the variation to a lease will be so significant that it will amount to a novation of the 
lease and an effective of surrender of the existing lease by operation of law. If that occurs, the 
liability of the original lessee, and any guarantor of the existing lease, will be discharged. For 
example, in Jenkin R Lewis & Son Ltd v Kerman,23  an original lessee contended that there had 
been a surrender and regrant of a lease by operation of law when the terms of the original lease 
were varied by increasing the rent. Russell LJ, on behalf of the Court of Appeal found the mere 
agreement to increase the amount of the rent would not amount to a surrender and regrant of 
the existing lease. However, in reaching that conclusion His Lordship, in dictum, indicated that if 
the term of the lease were extended by agreement, or if the parties wished to add further land to 
the existing holding and the rent be increased accordingly, this would amount to the granting of 
a new lease which would be preceded by the surrender of the old.24 However, that said, whilst 
the execution of a deed of variation of rent may not completely discharge the original lessee as 
a surrender and regrant, the liability of the original lessee may be limited to that which it may 
have been under the original lease without the variation.  
 
For example, in Friends’ Provident Life Office v British Railways Board,25 a lease provided for an 
annual rent of £12,000. A later assignee of the lease agreed with the lessor to a variation of the 
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terms of the lease which increased the rent to £35,000 and altered the covenants as to user and 
alienation. The court found that the lease between the original parties could not be varied or 
increased by a subsequent agreement made by the lessor and the assignee and that the 
original lessees obligations remained as they stood, that is, liable for up to the original rent but 
not being responsible for the additional rent, the subject of the variation.26 
 
It is interesting to observe that if the original lessee had been a guarantor in the true sense of 
that word, the guarantee may well have been discharged upon the basis that a variation in the 
agreement to this extent, not contemplated by the original guarantee, would be a material 
alteration in the guarantor’s liability sufficient to cause its discharge. However, the nature of the 
original lessee’s liability has been held not to be that of suretyship or guarantee. It is a covenant 
for the payment of the rent and performance of the terms subject to the lease for its duration.27  
Indeed, a true guarantor who guarantees the performance of a lease which expressly 
contemplates assignment and rent review, must run the risk of incurring potentially high liability 
if there is a substantial increase in rent upon a review, and, likewise, runs the risk of 
guaranteeing the payment of rent in circumstances where a subsequent assignee of the lease 
may not have the financial substance of the first lessee who was initially guaranteed. In Johnson 
Bros (Dyers) Ltd v Davison,28 Lord Hanworth MR held, in similar circumstances, that a change 
in the identity of the lessee through assignment was not such a substantial alteration so as to 
discharge the guarantor. His Lordship was mindful of the fact that the lease which was 
guaranteed expressly contemplated assignment. The guarantor was aware of the terms of the 
lease when executing the guarantee. Almost invariably, neither an original lessee nor a 
guarantor would be afforded any opportunity of vetting the financial substance and stability of an 
incoming assignee. It must be said that whilst guarantors add value to a lease as far as the 
lessor is concerned, if they sign a guarantee of a lease which is not conditioned to lapse upon 
the assignment of the lease, particularly if a lease is for a lengthy term which may be 
assignable, they do so at peril.  
 
There is no comfort in these principles for an original lessee provided that the liability sought to 
be enforced arises from the terms and conditions of the lease as executed between the original 
parties. 
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Lessor’s Discretion to Sue Any Solvent Party 
Where an assignee of a lease falls into breach, and where prior assignments and the execution 
of a guarantee may have left other parties liable, it is a matter for the lessor from whom redress 
should be sought. The lessor may, in its discretion, elect to issue proceedings against the 
assignee in breach, previous assignees, the original lessee, the guarantors or any one of those 
parties individually or together. There is no obligation upon the lessor to exhaust its remedies 
against the defaulting lessee in possession before seeking redress from any other party who 
might be liable, including the original lessee. Indeed, it may be pointless to pursue a claim 
against the defaulting assignee if that assignee is insolvent which is not unusual. However, the 
release of one of those parties will not automatically release the others.  
 
In Cashmere v Morris and Waldron,29 a lessor elected to sue an original lessee having 
ascertained that the other persons liable, including a guarantor, were not solvent. Upon 
reaching a settlement arrangement with the guarantor, subject to certain conditions, the original 
lessee being sued claimed that it was also released from further liability on the basis that it 
shared joint liability with the guarantor and the release of one joint debtor discharged all debtors.  
The court found that the obligations of the original lessee and guarantor were not joint liabilities.  
In this particular case, however, the court found that the guarantor had not been released but 
that the lessor had merely agreed not to sue the guarantor upon conditions.30 It is submitted that 
because the original lessee and guarantor are not jointly liable, even if the guarantor had been 
released, the original lessee would remain liable.31 Clearly, the original lessee’s covenant 
creates a primary liability, not that of a guarantor. The original lessee’s only possible defences 
to a claim by a lessor is that the assignee is not in default, that the original lessee has 
performed the covenants or that the lease has been surrendered expressly or by operation of 
law a surrender and this has put a complete end to any liability to pay rent.32 
 
Of course, conversely, if the defaulting assignee is released expressly, the liability of the original 
lessee would be discharged.33 
 
 
                                                 
29
  [1993] 3 NZLR 587. 
30
  Ibid at 592. 
31
  Allied London Investments Ltd v Hambro Life Assurance Ltd (1983) 269 Estates Gazette 41. 
32
  Ibid at 46 per Walton J. 
33
  Deanplan Ltd v Mahmoud [1992] 3 All ER 945 at 959-960 per Judge Paul Baker QC sitting as a judge of the 
High Court. 
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Consequences of Original Lessee Losing the Estate or Interest in the Land 
It is clear that once a lease is assigned, whist there is privity of contract remaining between the 
lessor and the original lessee, there is no privity of estate. Although the original lessee may 
remain contractually liable to the lessor, the assignee of the lease and equally, subsequent 
assignees who no longer enjoy privity of estate with the lessor, cannot be properly described as 
a lessee. None retain any interest in the land.34 However, the loss of the estate by the original 
lessee does not affect the rights and liabilities created by the privity of contract with the lessor 
but has other important consequences. The most obvious of these is that the original lessee has 
no standing to seek relief against forfeiture of the lease which might have the effect of lessening 
ultimate liability. 
 
For example, in Chelfield Pty Ltd v Goldsea Pty Ltd,35 the assignee of a lease of a restaurant fell 
into arrears and a Notice to Remedy Breach of Covenant under s 124 of the Property Law Act 
1974 (Qld)36 was served upon the assignee. The assignor of the lease who had previously 
conducted the restaurant and who remained liable to the lessor under both the lease and the 
deed of covenant, wished to reduce its liability by retaking possession of the premises and 
reviving the restaurant business. The assignor accordingly sought the right to have the Notice to 
Remedy Breach of Covenant served upon it to enable it to make an application to the court for 
relief against forfeiture. Holmes J found that the assignor, having assigned the lease, no longer 
held an interest in the land. Therefore, it had no standing to receive a Notice to Remedy Breach 
of Covenant nor any right to apply to the court for relief against forfeiture.37 In effect, the 
assignor, having no estate in the land had no right to possession after the assignment, 
regardless of the fate of the assignee and potential liability as a result of the default of the 
assignee.38 Even if the lease is disclaimed by a liquidator, as onerous property, the obligation to 
pay rent will remain with the original lessee or that lessee’s guarantor notwithstanding the 
disclaimer.39  
 
 
                                                 
34
  City of London Corporation v Fell, Herbert Duncan Ltd v Cluttons (a firm) [1993] QB 589 at 603 per Nourse 
LJ; affirmed on appeal City of London Corporation v Fell [1994] 1 AC 458. 
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  [2003] 2 Qd R 243. 
36
  Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 129 (1); Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), s 146; Landlord and Tenant Act 
1936 (SA), s 10; Property Law Act 1969 (WA), s 81; Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas), s 
15 (1); Law of Property Act 2004 (NT), s 137 (2). 
37
  [2003] 2 Qd 243 at 248; see also Ladies Sanctuary Pty Ltd v Parramatta Property Investment Ltd (1997) 7 
BPR 15,156; Old Papa’s Francise Systems Pty Ltd v Camisa Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 11. 
38
  Milmo v Carreras [1946] KB 306 at 311. 
39
  Hindcastle Ltd v Barbara Attenborough Associates Ltd [1996] 1 All ER 737 (HL). 
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Can an Original Lessee Limit or Extinguish Liability? 
There are several issues that an original lessee can take up to limit liability. One commentator40 
suggests a number of things. Firstly, that it is open to the lessee to expressly limit liability until 
the time of an assignment. Secondly, the original lessee might ask at the time of seeking the 
lessor’s consent to the assignment for a release from its obligations arising after the 
assignment. Thirdly, the commentator suggests that the lease not contain provision for an 
assignment so that a request for an assignment operates as a surrender of the lease, thus 
requiring the assignee, so called, to enter into a new lease thus discharging all liability under the 
previous lease.41 This would be possible where the lessee covenants with the lessor where the 
lessee desires to assign the lease, the lessee shall before doing so offer in writing a surrender 
of the lease to the lessor without any consideration. Upon acceptance of the offer to surrender, 
the existing lease would be discharged. These clauses have been found to be valid.42 However, 
all these alternatives depend upon the agreement of the lessor. If they amount to a loss of 
security for the payment of rent or damages as far as the lessor is concerned, the lessor is 
unlikely to be inclined to agree to any of them. 
 
An original lessee enjoys few benefits after assignment. If an original lessee is forced to make a 
payment in discharge of the obligations of a defaulting assignee, the assignee is under an 
obligation to indemnify the original lessee against any loss or damage suffered.43 However, it 
would appear that in the case of a registered lease, this right of indemnity would not flow until 
the assignment of the lease was registered.44 This right is also not greatly comforting to an 
original lessee as the indemnity is more likely than not to be a hollow promise if the defaulting 
assignee has no substance. The only concession made by a lessee in this area was that an 
original lessee could seek indemnity against the solvent guarantor of a subsequent defaulting 
assignee who was insolvent.45 
 
The Reform in England and Wales 
One of the principal drivers of the reform in England and Wales have been the complaints of   
original lessees, who, as parties to assigned leases, have been required to make good losses 
incurred by a lessor through the insolvency of a subsequent, and until then unknown and 
                                                 
40
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44
  Murphy v Harris [1924] St R Qd 187 at 189-190 per Lukin J. 
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insolvent assignees. This insolvency may occur years after the lease was granted and long after 
the original lessee has left possession. That original lessee may have taken on the burden of 
another lease. In the words of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Hindcastle Ltd v Barbara 
Attenborough Associates Ltd,46 a person of modest means is understandably shocked when out 
of the blue he receives a rent demand from the landlord of a property he once leased. Unlike the 
landlord, he had no control over the identity of the assignees down the line. He had “no 
opportunity to reject them as financially unsound”.47 However, the Landlord and Tenant 
(Covenants) Act 1995 which followed had a stormy passage through the British Parliament and 
lessees did not get everything their own way. As a concession to lessors, in consideration of 
abolishing the privity provisions between original parties for leases after the statute came into 
force,48 but not for earlier leases, the legislation gives lessors the ability, in certain 
circumstances, to extract a guarantee from the immediate assignee provided it does not extend 
beyond the next assignment and, further relaxes the conditions set by a lessor as conditions of 
assignment.49 The lessor can specify the circumstances in which consent can be withheld and 
these will not be subject to any “reasonableness test” by the legislation or the court.50 The 
legislation did not meet with unqualified approbation, one critical commentator suggesting that 
the provisions could be circumvented by totally prohibiting assignment in favour of restrictive 
subletting to which the Act did not apply.51 However, in deference to the author of the 
suggestions, both were seen as relatively impractical and a business lease without a right to 
assign, albeit qualified, would be of little attraction to potential assignees.52  
 
Is There a Case for Reform in Australia? 
The pre 1996 position in England and Wales pertains in Australia in non-retail, commercial 
leases. Is it a sufficient problem here to warrant consideration of a similar amendment to the 
statutes?   
One of the principal differences between commercial leases in Australia and the United 
Kingdom has been the length of the term. The longer the term, the greater the likelihood of 
multiple assignments, and therefore the higher degree of risk of an original lessee being held 
                                                 
46
  [1996] 1 All ER 737 (HL). 
47
  Ibid at 742. 
48
  1 January, 1996. 
49
  Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 133B (1)(a); Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), s 144 (1)(section applies unless 
lease contains an express provision to the contrary); Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 121 (1)(a); Property 
Law Act 1969 (WA), s 80 (application of section subject to any express provision contrary in the lease); Law 
of Property Act 2000 (NT), s 134(1). 
50
  Martin Davey, “Privity of Contract and Leases-Reform at Last” (1996) 59 The Modern Law Review 78 at 91. 
51
  Philip Walter, “The Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995: A Legislative Folly” [1996] Conv. 432 at 433.  
52
            Ibid at 439-440. 
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liable for the default of a subsequent assignee. Whilst there have been cases of original lessee 
liability reported in Australia and New Zealand,53 they have not been as frequent as those 
elsewhere, notwithstanding the application of the privity rules. More commonly, where 
commercial property is leased to private corporations, the leases are normally guaranteed by 
directors and this is often a condition of assignment laid down in the lease. Even if the condition 
is not expressed in the lease as a condition of assignment to a private corporation, it has not 
been held to be unreasonable.54 Recourse is usually had to guarantors in the first instance if the 
defaulting assignee is insolvent, before suing original lessees. Secondly, it is not uncommon to 
require a bank guarantee of rent as a condition of granting a lease and it has been held that the 
benefit of these guarantees to the lessor may pass with the reversion.55 Again, the recourse to 
the guarantee often satisfies any arrears of rent which may have otherwise become the 
responsibility of the original lessee. Thirdly, in the retail leasing sector, one of the major 
objectives of the legislation is to protect the small trader who is seen in the legislation as a 
consumer of leasing services. These lessees are usually retailers whose only capital sits in their 
businesses, many of whose profits can be marginal, and, because of the shortness of their 
leases, their business value is not substantial. Obviously, the spectre of being responsible for 
the arrears of another defaulting small trader, well after an assignment is repugnant to the 
objectives of the legislative scheme and it is not surprising that the privity of contract rule has 
been abolished for retail lease assignments in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. 
Other States and Territories may follow suit. It is also noteworthy that the conditions of 
assignments of retail leases are highly regulated,56 which mean effectively that retail lessors are 
restrained on two fronts, both in relation to the right to access the original retail lessee to make 
good a subsequent default of an assignee but also constricted in relation to placing more 
stringent conditions upon their rights to assign.   
 
It is true that the original lessee is the lessor’s sole choice whereas an assignee is the choice of 
the assignor subject to the consent of the lessor and the overriding jurisdiction of the court to 
declare that a refusal of consent to an assignment is unreasonable. However, it is submitted 
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  In New Zealand, see, for example, Robert Jones Investments Ltd v The Attorney General (1994) ANZ Conv 
R  619. 
54
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that a non-retail lessor now has greater control over acceptance or rejection of a person as an 
assignee where the lessor considers the prospective assignee unsuitable. If the lessor were 
only permitted to object to an assignee on narrow grounds, this may well vindicate the retention 
by the lessor of the right to sue the original lesse e as security for the performance of the lease 
in the future by, for example, an assignee with lesser financial substance than the original 
lessee. If there were a countervailing relaxation in the ability of the lessor to set conditions of 
assignment, there would be less reason for even the immediate assignor to remain liable to the 
lessor for the period that the immediate assignee is in possession. 
 
That said, there does not appear to be any public clamour in Australia for change to the privity 
rule in non-retail leases. This may be for the reasons stated above or simply because it is not an 
issue which arises frequently, or at least, does not often reach litigation. A number of 
spectacular cases in the late 1980’s and early 1990s in England renewed the call for reform 
which was ultimately supported in judicial remarks in the House of Lords.57 It is submitted that 
the reform in the case of retail leasing is purpose directed at a specific, vulnerable market. If 
there were reform across the board, it is hoped that other issues, such as the relaxation of the 
assignment conditions as to unreasonably withholding consent, might be reconsidered as 
occurred with the reform in England and Wales. Such an undertaking would involve deeper and 
different considerations than those required to amend retail leasing legislation. It may well 
involve the conditions of assignment being explicit in the lease itself so that an intending original 
lessee and those assignees who follow, are patently aware of the conditions of assignment and 
can negotiate other terms accordingly, for example, rent.  This would involve the removal of any 
contractual or statutory imposition concerning what constitutes “the unreasonable withholding of 
consent”. The conditions would be either fulfilled or not fulfilled, although it is conceded that a 
court might still have ultimate jurisdiction over whether the conditions had been achieved in the 
event of disagreement. 
 
In this day and age, the retention of a claim against an original lessee for a breach by a 
subsequent assignee, which may be many years down the track, seems faintly ridiculous, 
especially given the fact that once the lease has been assigned, the original lessee loses not 
only privity of estate but any control over, or even knowledge of, the actions of the lessor in their 
acceptance of subsequent assignees. It is inappropriate now that this should be the price of 
permitting a lessee to assign. It is clear that there are other more satisfactory and certain 
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methods of dealing with this situation. This may indeed be one argument for privity of estate to 
be synchronous with privity of contract, effectively abolishing the distinction, but a more 
comprehensive case for this can await another day. 
 
 
 
 
 
